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1 Introduction
Since the seminal papers of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a), Aghion and
Howitt (1992), endogenous growth theorists have focused on a single type of equilibrium.
They assume that each innovation, produced by the research and development (R&D)
sector, is associated to a particular intermediate good. Each good is then produced
by a single producer, who benefits from an intellectual property right, like a patent, to
produce and to sell it. In this case, research is privately and indirectly funded by the
monopoly profits of intermediate producers. In this type of equilibrium, a market and
a price are specified for intermediate goods that embody innovations; however, in our
knowledge, neither in the literature on endogenous growth nor in the books of Grossman
and Helpman (1991b), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), Aghion and Howitt (1998), any
author has defined a market and a price for discoveries. Our question is then the following:
why a good which needs scarce resources as inputs in its production technology (i.e. which
is costly to produce), has not any price? A consequence of this type of analysis is that we
do not know the system of prices that implements the first best optimum; moreover, the
equilibrium considered can be interpreted as a second best one since it displays incomplete
markets.
Independently of endogenous growth theory, a large literature on the funding of inno-
vations has been developed. Several authors, like Arrow (1962), Tirole (1988), Scotchmer
(1991, 1999), Dasgupta et al (1996), Gallini and Scotchmer (2003), insist on the diffi-
culty of research funding, in the sense of providing private incentives to innovate, and in
achieving an optimal allocation of resources in a decentralized economy, because innova-
tions are public (non-rival) and indivisible goods. These authors propose several schemes
to construct equilibria; however, they do not formalize their ideas in a growth model.
The first purpose of this paper is to make a synthesis of these two literatures. To do
it, we use the model of Jones and Williams (2000) which is a complete and representative
example of the standard growth theory. Inside this model, we formalize the ideas of the
authors quoted above, by characterizing the equilibrium with complete markets of the
model (the benchmark). Contrary to the standard literature on growth, (in particular,
contrary to Jones and Williams (2000)), we distinguish ideas which are public and indi-
visible goods, from the private and divisible intermediate goods that are produced around
them. Then, we account for the case in which intellectual property rights are given to
ideas rather than to intermediate goods. On that point we follow Arrow (1962) who
writes: “the property rights may be in the information itself, through patents and similar
legal devices” (p. 149). Concerning the type of property rights that are used, and the way
they must work, we follow Scotchmer (1991) who explains: “a system of property rights
that might seem natural would be to protect the first innovator so broadly that licensing
is required from all second generations innovators who use the initial technology, whether
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in research or in production” (p. 32). In other words, we assume that researchers keep
the property rights, and license (rent) their discoveries to potential users: if an agent does
not pay to acquire a license, he is excluded from its use.
The analysis of this equilibrium allows to compute the system of prices which allows
to implement the first order optimum: in this sense, it is a normative solution of the
model. However, it can also be considered as a first step to future researches in which
ideas would be directly priced. Indeed, since the mid eighties, one can observe an evo-
lution of the intellectual property law in which innovations are directly patented. For
instance, Varian (1998) writes: “Up until recently, the US Patent Office and the courts
interpreted algorithm as “mathematical formulas” which could not be patented. However,
in the mid eighties they reversed this policy and began to issue patents for softwares algo-
rithms. Subsequently the patent office has issued many thousands of software patents”.
This example concerns the software industry. We can quote other sectors in which this
type of patent is used. For instance, Sctochmer (1999) explains that “Incyte, Human
Genome Science, Celera sell access to their data-bases at millions of dollars per year per
user, providing bioinformatics search tools and other enhancements in addition to gene
sequences”. Similarly, Henry, Trommetter and Tubiana (2003) say that “Human Genome
Science owns a patent on the gene that produces the protein CCR5. The researchers
of the National Institutes of Health have used this discovery to produce a medicine for
AIDS. They have been obliged to buy a license to use the protein”.
The synthesis of the standard literature on growth and of the non-formalized literature
on intellectual property rights on ideas allows us to shed a new light on several questions
often studied, that is the second purpose of the paper.
The first question concerns the evaluation of the social value of an innovation. We
show that the distinction between innovations, which are public goods, and the private
intermediate goods which embody them, allows to compute this social value. In particular,
we find again the ideas of Scotchmer (1991, 1999), Gallini and Scotchmer (2003) along
which research is basically cumulative. This analysis leads to a value which is different
from the one computed by Jones and Williams (2000), and also different from the one
generally used in Industrial Organization Theory.
The second question concerns the identification of the distortions that prevent the
decentralized equilibrium to be optimal. In their analysis, Jones and Williams (2000)
explain that, theoretically, it is possible to obtain either excessive or insufficient invest-
ments in research compared to the optimum. According to the authors, this result comes
from the combination of four distortions that remain in the standard equilibrium analyzed
in growth theory, and that have opposite effects on the amount of resources devoted to
research: on the one hand, the appropriability effect and the knowledge spill-over effect
induce under-investments in research; on the other hand, the creative destruction effect
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and the duplication (or redundancy) effect, lead to over-investments.1 We show that the
externalities inside the R&D sector are the only remaining distortions with respect to
the first best optimum when the equilibrium displays complete markets; the other dis-
tortions appear as a result of the assumptions of incomplete markets and no first-price
discrimination for intermediate goods.
The third question concerns the empirical observation on the insufficient investments
in research: for instance, Jones and Williams (1998) estimate that actual investments
are at least four times under what would be socially optimal. Since we show that the
duplication effect is the only remaining distortion when the equilibrium displays complete
markets, the debate on the factors that induce insufficient investments in research is still
opened. A possible alternative explanation for this feature is based on the fact that ideas
are public goods: innovators cannot appropriate the entire amount of the surplus they
create in the economy, in particular because they face verifiability, excludability, and
information problems. For instance, this explanation is consistent with Dasgupta et al
(1996) who write: “The market mechanism has a tendency to discourage the production
of public goods because of an inability on the part of producers to appropriate fully the
value of the fruits of their activity” (p. 9).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we describe the model
and we study the benchmark equilibrium. In Section 3, we compute the social value of an
innovation; we analyze the nature of the distortions exhibited in the standard literature;
and, we study the question of under-investments in research. In Section 4, we conclude.
The Appendix is gathered in Section 5.
2 Model and Benchmark Equilibrium
2.1 The Model
We consider a similar model to Jones and Williams (2000). The only one difference is
that we do not introduce the creative-destruction effect, because we consider a model
with horizontal differentiation. Time is continuous and three kinds of goods are produced
in the economy: a consumption-capital good (“output”), ideas and intermediate goods.
Technologies and preferences are described as follows. Total output, Yt, produced at time
t, is given by
1The distortions evoked by Aghion and Howitt (1998), namely the intertemporal spill-over effect, the
appropriability effect and the business stealing effect (see chapter 2, p. 79)) recovers from the same type
of analysis. The only difference comes from the type of model used to conduct the analysis. In their book,
the authors use a model with vertical differentiation whereas we use a one with horizontal differentiation.
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Yt = (Lt)
α


AtZ
0
(xt (i))
ρ(1−α) di


1/ρ
, (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) , 0 < ρ < 1/ (1− α) .2 Lt is the total amount of labor in the economy
growing at exogenous and constant rate n, xt (i) is the variety of capital (intermediate)
good i used at time t, and At denotes the range of types of intermediate goods that have
been produced at time t.
We assume that the production of a capital good requires the preliminary production
of an innovation. Then, once a new idea is discovered, an intermediate good can be
produced around it. Each good is produced by an intermediate firm that uses physical
capital according to a one for one technology: xt (i) = kt (i) . Since all the amount of
physical capital is used to produce the range of types of intermediate goods, we have
AtZ
0
xt (i) di =
AtZ
0
kt (i) di = Kt, (2)
where Kt is the total amount of physical capital in the economy. It is accumulated
according to
•
Kt = Yt − Ct −Rt, (3)
where Ct is aggregate consumption and Rt is the total amount of resources devoted to
research.
Ideas are produced by a large number J, (j = 1, ..., J), of firms whose technologies are
given by
•
Ajt = ξtRjt (At)
φ , (4)
where φ < 1 allows past discoveries to either increase (φ > 0) , or decrease (φ < 0) , current
research productivity;
•
Ajt is the number of innovations produced per unit of time by firm
j; Rjt represents the amount of resources employed in firm j. The term ξt is a productivity
factor which is external to each firm. It verifies ξt = δ (Rt)
λ−1 , where Rt =
PJ
j=1Rjt is
the total amount of resources used in research; δ > 0 is a constant productivity parameter;
λ ∈ ]0, 1] allows to take into account the possibility of duplication effect or redundancy
in research. If we sum over j, then the total number of ideas produced per unit of time
is given by
2Jones and Williams use a slightly different production function given by Yt =
(Lt)
α
³PAt
i=1 (xt (i))
ρ(1−α)
´1/ρ
. Of course the two approaches are equivalent. However, we prefer
to treat At as a continuous variable to simplify the calculations.
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•
At = δ (Rt)
λ (At)
φ . (5)
Contrary to what is generally done in the standard literature on endogenous growth,
we distinguish an innovation which is a public (non-rival) and indivisible good3 from the
private and divisible intermediate good which embodies it. The non-rival property implies
that ideas can be used jointly by many agents. The property of indivisibility implies that
once a piece of knowledge has been acquired, there is no value added in acquiring it again.
Formally, an innovation, i, is a point of the segment [0, At]; we interpret it as a scientific
report. For example, we distinguish the medical formula of a vaccine from the vaccine
itself. The first good is non-rival. Its marginal cost of production is nil; it can be used
again and again without any additional cost. The second good is a private one. Once it
has been injected to treat an individual, it is necessary to produce it again.
The preferences of the representative agent are represented by the discounted utility
function
U =
∞Z
0
u (Ct/Lt) e−θtdt, (6)
where Ct/Lt is per-capita consumption, θ > 0 is the rate of time preferences, u
0
(•) > 0,
u
00
(•) < 0, and γ = −u00 (•)Ct/
£
u
0
(•)Lt
¤
is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
2.2 Benchmark Equilibrium
The aim of this sub-section is to construct an equilibrium in which prices allow to im-
plement the first best optimum. To do it, we define a price both for innovations (public
goods) and for private intermediate goods that embody them. It is clear that generally,
in the real world, these prices (in particular the prices of innovations) are not observed.
Thus, this equilibrium with complete markets has to be interpreted as a normative so-
lution of the model. In this case, we show that the externalities inside the R&D sector
(the duplication effect) are the only distortions that prevent the equilibrium to coincide
with the first best optimum. To remove this distortion and to be able to implement an
optimal path, we assume that a tax rate, τ t, is charged on R&D firms.
As we said in the introduction, the analysis conducted in this section is a formalization
of ideas already expressed in the literature by Arrow (1962), Dasgupta et al (1996),
Tirole (1988), Scotchmer (1991, 1999), Gallini and Scotchmer (2003), but which have
not retained attention of endogenous growth theorists since the seminal papers of Romer
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). In other words,
3See Arrow (1962), Dasgupta et al (1996) among others who define ideas in the same way.
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we characterize an equilibrium which has not been, in our knowledge, studied in the
standard literature on growth.
We assume that property rights are given to ideas rather than to intermediate goods
(see the citation of Arrow (1962) given in the introduction): innovators license (rent)
innovations to potential users. Thus, any agent using a patented innovation rewards
directly the researcher or the scientist who has produced it.
Shy (1991) explains that 80 percent of patents are licensed. In the present paper, we
study the case of non-exclusive licenses which is consistent with the following example of
Arrow (1962): “Suppose, as the result of elaborate tests, some metal is discovered to have
a desirable property, say resistance to high heat. Then of course every use of the metal for
which this property is relevant would also use this information, and the user would be made
to pay for it. But, even more, if another inventor is stimulated to examine chemically
related metals for heat resistance, he is using the information already discovered and
should pay for it in some measure; and any beneficiary of his discoveries should also pay”
(p. 150). (See also the citation of Scotchmer (1991) given in the introduction of the
paper).
The public good property of knowledge raises several questions. The first ones are
standard in economics literature: they are relative to the possibility to verify which agent
uses a discovery; they are linked to the possibility to exclude any agent that does not pay
to use an innovation; they concern the information about the willingness to pay of agents
to use an innovation. Since we study the normative solution which corresponds to the first
best optimum, we assume that there are not any problems of verifiability, excludability
and information: in other words, each innovator is able to extract the willingness to pay
of any agent which uses his innovation. Note that in this case, we follow for instance
Dasgupta et al (1996) who write: “It is as well to note here that [...] the producer (or
owner) of a piece of information should ideally set different prices for different buyers,
because different buyers typically value the information differently. In economics, these
variegated prices are called Lindahl prices, in honor of the person who provided the first
articulation of this scheme” (p. 10). As said above, it is clear that this normative solution
cannot be considered as a positive one: generally we do not observe it in the real world.
In this model, three types of agents use the discoveries produced by the R&D sector:
the firm of the output sector, R&D firms and intermediate producers. Each of them buys
a license to use an innovation. Formally, we call respectively vY t (i) , vjt (i) and vxt (i) ,
the willingnesses to pay (Lindahl prices) of the final sector, of the R&D firm j, and of any
intermediate producer i to use the innovation i at time t. Using the fact that innovations
are treated symmetrically, we can write vY t (i) ≡ vY t, vjt (i) ≡ vjt, and vxt (i) ≡ vxt.
Thus, the instantaneous value of an innovation is given by vt = vY t + vAt + vxt, where
vAt =
PJ
j=1 vjt. Finally, Vt =
R∞
t
vse−
R s
t rududs is the value of an innovation at time t.
In the present analysis, vY t, vAt and vxt represent, for each agent using an idea, the
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difference between its profit when it uses a new discovery with its profit when it does
not: in this section, we compute the surpluses created by the public, indivisible and
infinitely-lived durable good in each sector using it as a productive factor.
The second type of problem raised by the public good property of innovations comes
from the non convexity of technologies using ideas as productive factors. On this point, the
replication argument states that there are constant returns to scale with respect to private
inputs and increasing returns to scale with respect to both private and public inputs. As
in a competitive market the payment of private factors fully exhaust revenue, firms are
unable to pay for the public good they use.4 Thus, an equilibrium with perfect competition
on private goods markets does not exist if firms that pay to access to innovations are
not subsidized. To avoid this situation, we assume that the government subsidizes the
willingness to pay of firms. This economic policy, as the tax charged on R&D firms to
remove the duplication effect, is funded through a lump-sum tax (or lump-sum transfer),
Tt/Lt, charged (or given) to the representative individual. This assumption is the second
reason why the normative equilibrium studied here cannot be considered as a positive
one. In fact, in the real world, a large part of research is privately funded. To formalize
this type of equilibrium, it would be necessary to introduce imperfect competition on the
markets of sectors that use innovations (final output, research and intermediate goods):
this is out of the scope of this paper.
Remark 1 : the assumption of imperfect competition used in the seminal papers of Romer
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a), Aghion and Howitt (1992), does not solve the
problem of existence raised by the property of increasing returns to scale. Indeed, this
assumption concerns only the intermediate goods sector, and it allows to get positive prof-
its in order to fund indirectly research. However, in the two other sectors which use the
discoveries (final sector and R&D sector), the standard literature assumes perfect compe-
tition that is sustainable only because ideas have not any price, i.e. because markets are
incomplete.
We proceed as follows. First, we present the behavior of agents. Second, we derive the
solution of the equilibrium. The price of the final homogenous good is normalized to one.
The price of the intermediate good of type i, the level of wage, and the interest rate are
respectively noted qt (i) , wt, rt. There is perfect competition on all private goods markets
(Y, L, x(i) for all i ∈ [0, At]), including intermediate goods markets. The growth rate of
any variable z is noted gz.
4See for instance Kaizuka (1965), Sandmo (1972), Manning et al (1985), Feehan (1989), Romer (1990),
Jones (2003) among others.
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a) The competitive firm of the final sector maximizes its profit given by
πY t = (Lt)
α


AtZ
0
(xt (i))
ρ(1−α) di


1/ρ
− wtLt −
AtZ
0
qt (i) xt (i) di.
The first order conditions yield
wt = α
Yt
Lt
, (7)
and
qt (i) = (1− α) (Lt)α


AtZ
0
(xt (i))
ρ(1−α) di


1/ρ−1
(xt (i))
ρ(1−α)−1 . (8)
The willingness to pay to use an innovation at time t, is vY t = ∂πY t/∂At. Using the
previous first order conditions and the property of symmetry of intermediate goods, one
gets
vY t = σ
Yt
At
, (9)
where σ = 1/ρ− (1− α) .
b) Concerning the intermediate producers, we assume that they behave competitively.
Note that this behavior differs from the case described in the standard literature. Since
the technology of production of intermediate goods is xt (i) = kt (i) , it follows that the
unit price of an intermediate good is simply qt = rt. Moreover, the willingness to pay for
an innovation is nil. Indeed, if the intermediate producer i does not buy a license to use
the idea i, its profit is nil since it cannot produce any good. On the other hand, if it pays
to use the idea, its profit is also nil. As a consequence, the willingness to pay to use an
innovation is equal to zero, that is to say
vxt = 0. (10)
Remark 2 : the result vxt = 0 is linked to the constant returns to scale property of
the production function for intermediate goods. If the technology is strictly concave with
respect to kt (i), then vxt > 0.
c) In the R&D sector, at each time, the firm j licences the ideas it has produced
to each potential user (the final sector and the firms of the R&D sector). Then, it
maximizes the sum of the present values of its expected profits given by
R∞
0
[vtAjt −
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(1 + τ t)Rjt]e−
R∞
0 rududt, subject to the technology (4). Associating the co-state variable
νt to the law of motion of ideas in firm j, the Hamiltonian of this problem is
Γ = [vtAjt − (1 + τ t)Rjt] e−
R t
0
rudu + νtδ (Rt)
λ−1Rjt (At)
φ .
The first order conditions are: ∂Γ/∂Rjt = νtδ (Rt)λ−1 (At)φ − (1 + τ t) e−
R t
0 rudu = 0 (a),
and ∂Γ/∂Ajt = −
•
νt = vt.e−
R t
0 rudu (b). The transversality condition is lim
t→∞
νtAjt = 0.
Integrating (b) between t and infinity, we obtain
R∞
t
− •νsds =
R∞
t
vs.e−
R s
0 rududs, that
yields νt − ν∞ = (e−
R t
0 rudu)
R∞
t
vs.e−
R s
t rududs. Using the transversality condition and
the fact that Ajt > 0 for all t, we deduce that ν∞ = 0. Using the fact that Vt =R∞
t
vse−
R s
t rududs is the value of an innovation at time t, we can write νt = Vt.e−
R t
0 rudu.
Combining this result with (a), one gets Vtδ (Rt)
λ−1 (At)
φ = (1 + τ t) . Multiplying both
sides by Rt and using (5), we get
•
AtVt = (1 + τ t)Rt. (11)
The willingness to pay at time 0 for an innovation used at time t is ∂Γ/∂At =
νtφδ (Rt)
λ−1Rjt (At)
φ−1 . Multiplying both sides by e−
R t
0 rudu, one gets the willingness to
pay at time t for an innovation used at t, that is to say vjt = ∂Γ/∂At = Vtφδ (Rt)λ−1Rjt (At)φ−1 .
Replacing Vt by the expression obtained before, one gets
vjt =
φ (1 + τ t)Rjt
At
. (12)
Thus, the willingness to pay at time t for an innovation used at t by all firms of the
R&D sector is
vAt =
φ (1 + τ t)Rt
At
. (13)
d) For the government, we assume that the budget constraint is balanced at each time.
It is given by Tt = (vY t + vAt)At− τ tRt, where (vY t + vAt)At represents the total amount
of the subsidy distributed to the sectors that use innovations, and τ tRt is the tax charged
on research firms.
e) Finally, the representative household maximizes (6) subject to the budget constraint
given by
•
at = (rt − n) at+wt−Ct/Lt− Tt/Lt, where at = Kt+AtVt represents the stock
of wealth, and rt is the rate of return of his portfolio. One gets
•
u
0
u0
+ θ + n = γ (gCt − n) + θ + n = rt. (14)
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Now, we can determine the system of prices, the growth rates and the share of output
spent in research as a function of the tax rate, τ , in the benchmark equilibrium. Proposi-
tion 1 summarizes the results. We focus on balanced growth paths and equilibrium values
are denoted by the symbol “∗”.
Proposition 1 The benchmark equilibrium in which there is perfect competition in all
private goods markets, and innovations are rented at their Lindahl prices levels, is char-
acterized by the following system of prices:
r∗ = γ (gC − n) + θ + n,
w∗t = αYt/Lt,
v∗Y t = σYt/At,
v∗At = φ (1 + τ)Rt/At,
v∗xt = 0
V ∗t = (1 + τ ) (Rt)
1−λ (At)
−φ /δ.
The growth rates of quantities are:
g∗A =
λn
(1− φ− λσ/α) ,
g∗Y = g
∗
C = g
∗
R = g
∗
K =
σ
α
g∗A + n.
The share of resources allocated to research is:
s∗ =
σg∗A
(1 + τ ) (r∗ − (g∗Y − g∗A)− φg∗A)
.
Proof. See Appendix 5.1.
For each possible value of the tax rate, τ , there is an associated equilibrium. Only
one of these is optimal. Indeed, if we compare the steady-state optimum which is com-
puted in Appendix 5.2 with the characterization of the steady-state equilibrium given in
Proposition 1, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If the government chooses τ o = 1/λ− 1 > 0, the steady-state benchmark
equilibrium is optimal.
Proposition 2 implies that without any intervention from the government, a research
firm is attempted to hire an excessive amount of resources in order to innovate. The
reason is that it does not account for the duplication effect in research.
Note that ∂τ o/∂λ < 0. Thus, the higher is λ (i.e. the lower is the duplication effect
measured by this parameter), the lower will be the tax imposed on research firms to
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implement the optimum. And, if there is not any duplication effect in research, (i.e. if
λ = 1), it is not necessary to tax R&D firms. In that case, τ o = 0, and the benchmark
equilibrium path coincides with the optimal one. Basically, this result can be considered
as the proof that the equilibrium with complete markets considered here is the benchmark
of the model, in the sense that now we know the system of prices that implements the
first best optimum.
3 Social Value of Innovations, Distortions, and Insuf-
ficient Investment in R&D
The objective of this section is to clarify several points already studied in endogenous
growth theory. First, using the correspondence between benchmark equilibrium and first
best optimum, we compute the social value of innovations. Second, comparing the stan-
dard equilibrium with incomplete markets with the benchmark one, we show that, except
for the duplication effect, all distortions come from the assumptions of incompleteness and
no first-price discrimination for intermediate goods. Finally, we give an interpretation to
insufficient investment in R&D.
3.1 Social Value of Innovations
We can compute the value of an innovation by putting together the characterization of
the optimum (see equation (17) in Appendix 5.2) and the analysis of the benchmark
equilibrium (see sub-section 2.2). In the two cases, the instantaneous social value of an
innovation is:
vt = σ
Yt
At
+
φ
λ
Rt
At
, (15)
where vY t = σYt/At and vAt = φRt/ (λAt) are respectively the Lindahl prices, that is to
say the gross surpluses of an innovation, in the final sector and in the R&D sector (we
have here vxt = 0, see equation (10)). Recall that, since innovations are durable goods,
the value of an innovation at each time t is Vt =
R∞
t
vse−
R s
t rududs.
If τ o = 1/λ− 1, the characteristic Keynes-Ramsey condition of optimum, (17),
λ
•
At
Rt
½
σ
Yt
At
+
φ
λ
Rt
At
¾
+ gY − gA =
•
u
0
u0
+ ρ+ n,
corresponds to the condition vt/Vt +
•
Vt/Vt = rt of the benchmark equilibrium: the term
λ
•
At/Rt corresponds to 1/Vt (see equation (11)); σYt/At and (φRt) / (λAt) corresponds to
vY t and vAt (see above); the term gY − gA corresponds to
•
Vt/Vt; finally, the program of
the consumer yields to the usual condition
•
u
0
/u
0
+ ρ+ n = rt (see equation (14)).
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This formulation is consistent with ideas already expressed but without any formaliza-
tion in the literature on growth. For instance, Scotchmer (1999) writes: “The social value
of an invention is compounded by the fact that the discovery facilitates or becomes a basis
for future discoveries. The incremental value of the future discoveries should be counted
as part of the initial innovation’s social value created” (p. 1). Gallini and Scotchmer
(2003) explain: “The first and most fundamental complexity, articulated by Scotchmer
(1991), is that early innovators lay a foundation for later innovations. The later innova-
tions could not be made without the earlier ones. So that the first innovator has enough
incentive to invest, she should be given some claim on the profit of the later innovations;
otherwise, early innovators could be underrewarded for the social value they create” (p.
65). These authors explain that the social value created by a new idea must also account
for the surplus induced in the research activity. More generally it would account for the
surplus induced in all sectors using the discoveries as productive factors.
Remark 3 : the social value (15) is different from the expressions generally obtained in
the literature. For instance, Jones and Williams (2000) explain that innovators appropri-
ate only a part of the social value they create. They write: “[...] the gain of the society is
given by ∂Yt/∂At = σYt/At, [where σ = 1/ρ − (1− α)]” (p. 72).5 The social value they
compute corresponds only to the first term of (15), that is to say vY t. In fact, they neglect
the surplus generated in the R&D sector: innovators stand on the “Shoulders of Giants”
(Scotchmer (1991)).
Remark 4 : the standard Industrial Organization Theory considers the same type of
formula: the social value of an innovation is generally the net surplus under the demand
curve of the intermediate private good that embodies this innovation.
In fact, we can verify that the two approaches lead to the same expression. Indeed,
integrating (8) between 0 and xt (i) and using the fact that xt (i) = xt for all i ∈ [0, At] ,
one gets the gross surplus Yt/ (ρAt) . Then, subtracting the price qtxt = (1− α)Yt/At gives
the net surplus σYt/At, which is exactly the expression of Jones and Williams (2000), that
is to say only the first term of the social value given by (15).
Remark 5 : in sub-section 3.2 below, we recall the standard equilibrium generally studied
in endogenous growth theory from the seminal papers of Romer (1990), Grossman and
Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and which is also used Jones and Williams
(2000). With respect to the benchmark equilibrium, there are two basic assumptions: first,
5We have copied the exact sentence that we can find in the original paper of the authors. However,
note that there is a mistake here since ∂Yt/∂At = Yt/ (ρAt) 6= σYt/At. Then, the reader must read
∂πY t/∂At = Yt/ (ρAt) instead of the one given in the text.
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innovations, i.e. ideas, are not priced; second, innovators cannot practice a first degree
price discrimination. Due to incompleteness of markets, the second term of equation (15),
vAt = φRt/ (λAt) , disappears. Moreover, since there is not any price discrimination, the
market value of an innovation reduces to a share of vY t = σYt/At. For instance Jones and
Williams (2000) explain that innovators appropriate only a part of the social value they
create; they write, “Inventors appropriate the profit flow (κ − 1) (1− α)σYt/(κAt) [...] ”
(p. 65), where κ is a constant in their paper.
3.2 Distortions
The standard literature exhibits several distortions that prevent the decentralized equi-
librium to implement the first best optimum. Jones and Williams (2000) count four
distortions: first, the duplication effect (the R&D sector does not account for the redun-
dancy of some research projects); second, the intertemporal spill-over effect (innovators
do not account that ideas they produce are used to produce new ideas; third, the ap-
propriability effect (innovators appropriate only a part of the social value they create);
fourth, the creative-destruction effect, that we have not taken into account in this paper.
The analysis of the benchmark equilibrium shows that, with complete markets, perfect
competition in all private goods markets (in particular the market of intermediate goods),
and innovations funded at their Lindahl prices level, the only remaining distortion is the
redundancy in research: see Proposition 2. The other distortions, described by Jones
and Williams (2000), are only relevant in a second best equilibrium context, i.e. in an
equilibrium in which innovations are not priced (markets are incomplete), and patents are
given to intermediate producers that behave monopolistically. The reasons of this result
are the following. Since, innovators are directly rewarded by each agent using their dis-
coveries, they take into account that the ideas they produce are used by other researchers
to produce new ideas. Thus, the knowledge spill-over effect is removed. Concerning the
appropriability of the surplus created by the production of a new idea, since innovators
are able to extract the willingness to pay from agents that use their discoveries, they
appropriate the total amount of the social value they create: the appropriability of the
surplus is not a remaining distortion.
In the standard equilibrium generally studied in growth theory, for instance by Jones
and Williams (2000), ideas are not directly priced. Research is indirectly funded by the
monopoly profits on intermediate goods that embody these ideas. These assumptions
have two consequences. First, the incompleteness of markets explains the intertemporal
spill-over distortion: it well-known that it can be corrected by a subsidy to research
(see for instance Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), chapter 6). Second, the monopolies on
intermediate goods (and not on ideas) explain the appropriability effect: this distortion
can be removed by a subsidy on each intermediate demand (see also for instance Barro
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and Sala-I-Martin (1995)).
3.3 Insufficient research: Why?
In this section, we discuss about the empirical observation suggesting that investments in
research are insufficient. In the standard literature on endogenous growth, the question
of over or under-investments in research is often asked. According to empirical data, the
actual amount of resources devoted to research is insufficient.
On a theoretical side, R&D-based models predict that we may obtain either an exces-
sive or an insufficient allocation of resources in research. This well-known result in the
vertical differentiation class of models developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992), has also been obtained by Benassy (1998) in a model “à la
Romer (1990)”.6 The question we ask is the following: what is the type of equilibrium
considered? In their framework, Jones and Williams (2000) argue that “the main force
promoting under-investments is the consumer appropriability problem” (p. 76). As shown
in the two previous sub-sections, their analysis is made in a second best equilibrium con-
text, since markets are incomplete. The basic argument is that, since they are unable to
practice a first degree price discrimination, the sellers of intermediate goods extract only
a part of the surplus generated by these goods (see sub-section 3.1).
Here, we propose an explanation in a perspective of complete markets. Let us consider
an economy in which innovations are directly priced: see examples in the introduction.
Assume that each innovator licenses his innovation, but that he is not able to extract
the whole total surplus given by (15): he faces, for instance, verification, exclusion or
informational problems. Our explanation is based on the public nature of innovations. It
is not based on the gross markup over marginal cost set to sell an intermediate good as
explained by Jones and Williams. Formally, the instantaneous gain from the renting of
an innovation is now given by vFt = ηY vY t + ηAvAt, where ηk ∈ [0, 1], k = Y,A, represent
the constant and exogenous shares of the willingnesses to pay that are extracted. The
index “F” means fraction.
To facilitate the comparison between the results of this section with those of the opti-
mum, we assume that the government intervenes to remove the redundancy in research.
Using the same method than in the preceding section, we can show that the growth rates
and the real interest rate keep the same values. However, the share of output devoted to
research is now given by
sF =
ηY σgA
(1 + τ) (r − (gY − gA)− ηAφgA)
. (16)
6Benassy shows that if we modify slightly the technology of the output sector in a model with horizontal
differentialtion, it is possible to obtain either an excessive or a too low investment in research compared
to the optimum, inducing a too low or a too high long-run growth rate.
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From (16), we note that if the duplication effect in research is removed (i.e. 1/ (1 + τ) =
λ), sF ≤ so is always true, whatever the values of ηY and ηA. As a consequence, if in-
novators cannot extract the total surplus from agents that use their discoveries, then
investments in research are insufficient. The fact that ∂sF/∂ηk > 0, k = Y,A, means
simply that the amount of resources devoted to research increases with the part of the
social value that the R&D sector can appropriate. This result is consistent with Jones
and Williams (2000) who explain: “Calibrating the model to micro and macro data, we
find that our decentralized economy typically under-invests in R&D relative to what is
socially optimal. This is true unless the equilibrium real interest rate is relatively high
and the magnitude of duplication effects is simultaneously large” (p. 80).
Note that if the government does not intervene (i.e. if τ = 0), then it is possible to
obtain either sF < so, or sF > so. That is to say, investments in research can be either
too high or insufficient compared to the optimum. The reason is the following. There are
two driving forces that go in opposite directions and their combination has an ambiguous
effect on the final allocation of resources in research. On the one hand, the duplication
effect tends to increase the share of output devoted to research. On the other hand, the
fact that researchers cannot extract the entire amount of the social value they create
leads to a decrease in the share of output devoted to research. When the duplication
effect dominates, we obtain an excessive share allocated to research. If not, the reverse
happens.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we made a synthesis between the standard literature on endogenous growth,
and the literature (until now, non-formalized) on the funding of innovations developed by
authors like, for instance, Arrow (1962), Tirole (1988), Scotchmer (1991, 1999), Dasgupta
et al (1996), Gallini and Scotchmer (2003). We have distinguished the innovations (public
goods) produced by the R&D sector, from the private intermediate goods that embody
them. In this case, we have defined a price for both types of goods.
The synthesis of the two above literatures allowed to shed a new light on several ques-
tions. First, bringing together the benchmark equilibrium and the first best optimum,
we have computed the social value of an innovation. It is the sum of the surpluses of all
agents that use it in the economy. This formula allows to recover ideas already expressed,
for instance by Scotchmer (1999) and Gallini and Scotchmer (2003). This formula is
different from the one computed by Jones and Williams (2000); it is also different from
formulas usually used in Industrial Organization Theory. Second, we examined the ques-
tions related to the nature of the distortions that prevent the decentralized economy to
achieve the optimum: except for the duplication effect in research, we have shown that
the distortions discussed by endogenous growth theorists are relevant only in a second
16
best context, i.e. when ideas are not priced. Third, we have given an alternative inter-
pretation to the insufficient investments that are empirically observed in research. Using
an equilibrium with complete markets, we have explained that excludability, verifiability
and informational problems can prevent innovators to appropriate the total amount of
the surplus they create. That is, our interpretation is based on the public good nature
of innovations themselves rather than on the existence of potential distortions which are
relevant in some equilibria but not in others.
5 Appendix
5.1 Characterization of the benchmark equilibrium
We focus on steady-states. First, we compute the value of the growth rates of quantities.
To do it, we use (3), (5), the conditions (7), (8), (11), (14) and the property of symmetry
of intermediate goods in the final sector that implies xt(i) = xt for all i ∈ [0, At] , Yt =
(At)
1/ρ
(Lt)
α (xt)
(1−α) (see (1)), and Kt = Atxt (see (2)). Then, one can show that gY =
gC = gR = gK = σgA/α+n, where σ = 1/ρ− (1− α) , and gA = λn/ (1− φ− λσ/α) (see
also Jones and Williams (2000)).
Now, we determine the value of the share of resource, s = Rt/Yt, devoted to research
at steady-state. As mentioned in the text, in this case, the tax-rate must be constant:
we write τ t = τ for all t. Using (7) and (11), we obtain
•
Vt/Vt = gY − gA. Using (7),
(8) and the willingnesses to pay of agents to use an innovation ((9) and (13)), we obtain
vt/Vt = gAσ/ [(1 + τ ) s] + gAφ. Combining the two previous results with the fact that
rt =
•
Vt/Vt + vt/Vt =
•
u
0
/u
0
+ θ + n, (see equation (14)), one gets the value s∗ given in
Proposition 1.
The prices are given by equations (7) to (14).
5.2 Characterization of the steady-state optimum
The social planner’s problem is to maximize (6) subject to (1) to (3). Using the property
of symmetry of intermediate goods in the final sector, the Hamiltonian of this problem is
Γ = u (Ct/Lt) e−θt + µt
h
(At)
1/ρ
(Lt)
α (xt)
(1−α) − Ct −Rt
i
+νtδ (Rt)
λ (At)
φ / (1 + ψ) + ξt (Kt − Atxt) .
The first order conditions are: u
0
(Ct/Lt) e−θt = Ltµt (a), µt (1− α)Yt/xt = ξtAt (b),
µt = νtλ
•
At/Rt (c), ξt = −
•
µt (d), µtYt/ (ρAt)− ξtxt + νtφ
•
At/At = −
•
νt (e).
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Assume that the economy is at steady-state. In this case, we know that the growth
rates are constant and have the same value than in the case of the benchmark equilibrium
(the model is semi-endogenous).
Differentiating equations (a) and (c) with respect to time yield
•
u
0
/u
0
+θ+n = − •µt/µt
(f) and gµt = gνt − gRt + gAt (g). Combining equations (b) and (e), one gets µtYt[ρ −
(1− α)]/At + νtφ
•
At/At = −
•
νt; dividing each side by νt, and putting µt/νt in factor, one
obtains µt{Yt[ρ − (1− α)]/At + (νt/µt)φ
•
At/At}/νt = − •νt/νt. Finally, using (c), (f) and
(g), one gets
λ
•
At
Rt
½
σ
Yt
At
+
φ
λ
Rt
At
¾
+ gY − gA =
•
u
0
u0
+ θ + n. (17)
where σ = 1/ρ−(1− α) . Simplifying the expression of (17), we obtain so = σλgA/[γ(gC−
n) + θ + n− (gY − gA)− φgA] (see also Jones and Williams (2000), p. 72).
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